Regional Analysis in the Age of Populism

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Introduction

- Much (but not all) of rural America has struggled since the Great Recession’s conclusion in 2009, representing a long-run trend dating to the 1920s.
- Rural American will play a future role, but many rural places are economically unsustainable. Rural areas are the primary source of environment, food, energy, other commodities, natural amenities, water, etc.
- Rural lags in many ways. But trends are not always clear; e.g., for nonmetro/metro per-capita income:
- But underlying all of this are national trends.
Share of Income Earned by Top 1 Percent, 1975–2015

Percent

United States
Canada
Italy
Germany
United Kingdom
France
Japan

Source: World Wealth and Income Database.
A tale of two countries
The share of U.S. pre-tax income accruing to the bottom 50 percent and top one percent of income earners, 1962-2014


Note: The unit is the individual adult and incomes within married couples are split equally.
Total tax rate (federal, state and local)

Source: New York Times
Highest marginal tax rate

100 percent

1940 81%

Source: Tax Policy Center

US balance of trade, 1978–2018

Estate tax exemption

In 2016 dollars
$12 million

YEAR OF DEATH

1940 $686 thousand

*In 2010, the estate tax was repealed for one year.

Introduction

- These trends appear to have contributed to rising rural angst and even anger in some cases. This economic angst has helped spawn a rise of so-called “right-wing nationalist populist” movements with strong rural bases.
  - Emergence of right-wing nationalist populist movements have occurred in Europe, Brazil, Australia, India.
- Of course, historically, there are many examples of rural “populism” in the U.S.:
  - E.g., 1820s-1840s, 1870s, 1890s, 1920s-1930s
  - And rural America has tilted conservative for the last 50 years.
Introduction

• There are other factors involved in potential rural U.S. populism.
• Rural residents sometimes have an inferiority complex regarding urbanites.
• Feelings that the elites don’t weigh rural concerns in decision-making.
• Cultural differences and potential racial grievances.
• Decline of primary industries and manufacturing.
• All of this when rural America is a big net winner in terms of net federal expenditures.
1) What I want to do now is some armchair political analysis to see if there is anything special about today.

2) Then I will ask if rural America’s economy is really suffering. *Sort-of* but past trends recently accelerated.

3) Then I will discuss one potential cause that has been floated by both conservatives and progressives (AEI): *declining dynamism in the American economy that slows needed adjustments to higher-valued uses in capital and labor markets as well as spatially.*
Voting Patterns in rural, small, and large cities.

- Voting patterns show a strong urban/rural influence as one.
- The spatial patterns signify one area that strongly switched to Trump, which I will stress in my discussion of rural populism and rural economies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metro Definition and Change</th>
<th>Total Metro Votes</th>
<th>Trump Metro Votes</th>
<th>Trump Metro Votes Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Metro 1950</td>
<td>68,380,703</td>
<td>25,469,903</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Metro Def. Change 1950-1973</td>
<td>26,522,379</td>
<td>14,147,642</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Metro Def. Change 1993-2003</td>
<td>3,548,019</td>
<td>2,075,511</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Metro Def. Change 2003-2013</td>
<td>2,040,345</td>
<td>1,298,349</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Metro 2013</td>
<td>110,501,966</td>
<td>48,663,822</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Nonmetro 2013</td>
<td>19,409,615</td>
<td>12,401,021</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Total United States</td>
<td>129,911,581</td>
<td>61,064,843</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Townhall.com. Missing county-level data for Alaska. Current metropolitan counties are split into those defined in 1950 and those that were subsequently reclassified as metropolitan by time period of reclassification.
Romney vs. Trump Vote Shares

• Romney 2012
  • Nonmetro: 59.62%
  • Small metro: 53.81%
  • Large metro: 43.92%

• Romney 2012 - Trump 2016
  • Nonmetro: -7.39%
  • Small metro: -3.09%
  • Large metro: 0.97%

Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab
2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, All Counties

*Note: Figure contains Romney’s share of Romney and Obama’s votes only.

Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab
2016 Trump Presidential Election Share Minus 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, All Counties

Emerging “Populist” region

*Note: Figure contains Romney’s share of Romney and Obama’s votes only and Trump’s share of Trump and Clinton’s votes only.

Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab
2016 Trump Presidential Election Share Minus 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, Nonmetro Counties

*Note: Figure contains Romney’s share of Romney and Obama’s votes only and Trump’s share of Trump and Clinton’s votes only.

Especially Expect Rural “Populism” here

Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab
### Difference between Trump and Romney Vote Share Correlations, National

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Metro</th>
<th>Nonmetro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difference between Trump and Romney Vote Share vs. 2010 to 2018 Job Growth</td>
<td>-0.1921</td>
<td>-0.0853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference between Trump and Romney Vote Share vs. 2017 New Firm Employment Share</td>
<td>-0.1902</td>
<td>-0.1520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference between Trump and Romney Vote Share vs. 2006 to 2018 Percent Change in Job Creation</td>
<td>-0.0402</td>
<td>0.0030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference between Trump and Romney Vote Share vs. 2006 to 2018 Percent Change in Job Destruction</td>
<td>-0.1016</td>
<td>-0.0213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference between Trump and Romney Vote Share vs. 2016 Manufacturing Employment Share</td>
<td>0.2848</td>
<td>0.2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We now turn to rural economic structure and consider if things differ in the Trump “populist” region.

Then we examine relative rural job growth since the Great Recession. No surprise, rural has done poorly.

Rural is much more than agriculture.

Relative to urban America, rural manufacturing has fared much better.
Rural Development has not been a failure. Though true that it will be more difficult going forward. What’s left may be particularly cranky with migration rates historically low.
U.S. Payroll Growth, selected periods
Source QCEW

Today Rural/Nometro Job growth really lags

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001 to 2010</th>
<th>2010 to 2018</th>
<th>2001 to 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>-1.31</td>
<td>14.49</td>
<td>12.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Metro</td>
<td>-0.95</td>
<td>16.96</td>
<td>15.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Nonmetro</td>
<td>-3.19</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>-2.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Commodity Super Cycle
Population growth 1990-2017 (%)

1993 USDA and U.S. Census Bureau MSA Definitions
Population growth 2010-2017 (%)
1993 USDA and U.S. Census Bureau MSA Definitions

[Map showing population growth]
Nonmetro-Metro Domestic Net Migration and Nonmetro-Metro Gross Movers from Abroad

Source: U.S. Census Bureau’s CPS, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/geographic-
Decline almost everywhere.
Share of U.S. Manufacturing Employment in Nonmetro Areas and Nonmetro Manufacturing Location Quotient, 1969-2017

- Share of U.S. Manufacturing Employment in Nonmetro Areas
- Nonmetro Manufacturing Location Quotient

Source: BEA, https://www.bea.gov/data/employment/employment-county-metro-and-other-
Figure 1
Percentage of Total Jobs in Farming: 1969 - 2015

The western populist region is farm country and the eastern part was much more manufacturing.
Nonmetro farming-dependent counties, 2000

Source: Farming-dependent counties are defined by ERS. Metro/nonmetro status is based on the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) June 2003 classification.
2010 to 2018 Percent Change in Employment, Nonmetro Counties

Eastern populist region did relatively well, not so in the Western part.

Source: QCEW
Declining Dynamism

By declining dynamism since 1970s, I mean there is:

1) Less job creation and job destruction. Classic Schumpeterian creative destruction implies that resources are then less likely to flow to higher-valued uses. (not the same thing as saying net job growth has declined—though it has).

2) Lower rates of firm births and deaths. In terms of firm births, new firms and small firms disproportionately create new net jobs for the national economy (Neumark et al., 2011; Haltiwanger et al. 2013).
   - E.g., Low-productivity zombie firms kept alive by low interest rates. Schumpeterian disruptive forces and creative destruction are restricted.

3) Declining migration rates or less moving to opportunity or to more productive regions (Partridge et. al, 2012). OR people stay in struggling rural areas, becoming quite frustrated.
By declining dynamism, I mean there is:

4) Concentration of large firms with less product market competition leading to less innovation and higher prices.

5) Declining occupational mobility due to licensing and education requirements (Davis et al., 2012).

6) Declining labor-market fluidity: e.g., flows from employment to unemployment; from unemployment to employment; flows from employment to out of labor force; flows from out of labor force to employment; job to job changes; interstate migration; job creation; and job destruction (Malloy et al., 2016).

- May be caused by factors such as non-compete contracts, binding arbitration, nondisclosure agreements.
Trend in Labor Market Fluidity Across the U.S., 1980–2013

Fluidity has been declining nationally across 8 dimensions* since the early 1980s, but the trend varies by state.

*Dimensions include flows from employment to unemployment; from unemployment to employment; from employment to out of the labor force; from out of the labor force to employment; job to job changes; interstate migration; job creation; and job destruction.

Fewer opportunities to move to a better job or secure a better firm-worker match.

Figure A-1. Number of Movers and Mover Rate: 1948-2018

2018 Mover Rate: 10.1%

Note: The CPS sample design was generally updated in years ending in "5" based on previous decennial censuses.
* The migration question was asked differently between 1971 and 1980. Only 1971 and 1976 have a 1-year estimate comparable to all other years (1948-2018).

So, how much of rural America’s problem is their economies are becoming relatively less dynamic?

Job creation (job openings filled) are definitely a plus.

Some job destruction is necessary for “creative destruction” to shift resources to more productive uses. Of course, too much destruction would be problematic.

This spells places that would not have many opportunities and people would be stuck in bad settings.

Does this line up in the “populist” Northeast region?
Job Creation and Job Destruction as Percentages of Employment, Metro

Source: BDS
Rural job destruction has especially decreased over time. (also compared to metro)

Source: BDS
2018 Job Creation as a Percentage of Employment, Metro Counties

Note: Q1 2018 used for all states but MA, ME, and SD. Q2 2018 used for MA, Q4 2017 used for ME, and Q4 2016 used for SD.

Source: LEHD QWI
Relative job growth may not be “bad” but fewer new opportunities.
2018 Job Destruction as a Percentage of Employment, Nonmetro Counties

Source: LEHD QWI

Note: Q1 2018 used for all states but MA, ME, and SD. Q2 2018 used for MA, Q4 2017 used for ME, and Q4 2016 used for SD.
2006-2018 Percentage Change in Job Creation, Nonmetro Counties

Note: Q1 2006 and Q1 2018 used for all states but ME and SD. Q4 2006 and Q4 2017 used for ME. Q4 2006 and Q4 2016 used for SD. No 2006 data for MA.

Source: LEHD QWI
2006-2018 Percentage Change in Job Destruction, Nonmetro Counties

Note: Q1 2006 and Q1 2018 used for all states but ME and SD. Q4 2006 and Q4 2017 used for ME. Q4 2006 and Q4 2016 used for SD. No 2006 data for MA.

Source: LEHD QWI
• Small and new firms are associated with faster job growth and subsequently faster future economic growth.
• What are the patterns of small-firm and new-firm development?
Small Establishment Share of Total Establishments, National <50 employees

Source: CBP
New and Small Firm Employment Percentages, National

*Note: Q1 data used in all years.

Source: LEHD QWI
Self Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment, National

Source: BEA

Less rural entrepreneurship?
Nonfarm Self Employment Income as a Share of Nonfarm Personal Income, National

Less rural entrepreneurship?

Source: BEA
2017 Small Firm Employment Share, Nonmetro Counties

Fewer small firms—less entrepreneurship?

Note: Q4 2017 used for all states but SD. Q4 2016 used for SD. Small firms have 50 or fewer employees.
2017 New Firm Employment Share, Metro Counties

Note: Q4 2017 used for all states but SD. Q4 2016 used for SD. New firms are less than or equal to 3 years old.

Source: LEHD QWI
2017 New Firm Employment Share, Nonmetro Counties

Less New-firm job growth, less entrepreneurship?

Note: Q4 2017 used for all states but SD. Q4 2016 used for SD. New firms are less than or equal to 3 years old.
Conclusions

- Americans are increasingly divided along political and rural/urban lines.
- Some of this may related to weak national economic performance, rising inequities, perceptions of a “rigged” system.
- President Trump’s relative electoral gains were most impressive in “Northeast” nonmetro America.
- Outside of manufacturing’s role in driving some of this, topline rural economic numbers are not that different.
- But that region appears less dynamic in terms of less job creation, new-firm employment growth, fewer small firms, suggesting a somewhat less dynamic economy.
- This pattern applies more strongly in the eastern parts of the populist region.
Thank you

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Google Mark Partridge economist
## Per Capita GDP and Per Capita Income Correlations, National

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Metro</th>
<th>Nonmetro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015 per capita GDP vs. 2015 per capita personal income, unweighted</td>
<td>0.5523</td>
<td>0.5521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 per capita GDP vs. 2015 per capita personal income, population-weighted</td>
<td>0.7973</td>
<td>0.6040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2015 %Δ per capita GDP vs. 2012-2015 %Δ per capita personal income, unweighted</td>
<td>0.2213</td>
<td>0.3017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2015 %Δ per capita GDP vs. 2012-2015 %Δ per capita personal income, population-weighted</td>
<td>0.3490</td>
<td>0.3427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BEA
Median household income growth, 2000-2007

Annual % growth

- -1.08 - 1.63
- 1.64 - 2.06
- 2.07 - 2.43
- 2.44 - 2.91
- 2.92 - 6.45
### Historical Highest Marginal Income Tax Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Top Marginal Rate</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Top Marginal Rate</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Top Marginal Rate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>82.13%</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>82.13%</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>84.36%</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>91.00%</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
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<td>1917</td>
<td>67.0%</td>
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<td>92.00%</td>
<td>1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>1918</td>
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<td>92.00%</td>
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<td>1919</td>
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<td>1954</td>
<td>91.00%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>73.0%</td>
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<td>1923</td>
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<td>25.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
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<td>1928</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>39.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>39.60%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>25.0%</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2007</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>79.0%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>35.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>81.10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>35.00%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>81.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>88.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>35.00%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>88.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
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<td>1944</td>
<td>94.00%</td>
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<td>2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>94.00%</td>
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<td>2015</td>
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<td>1946</td>
<td>86.45%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>86.45%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>39.60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table contains a number of simplifications and ignores a number of other factors that affect tax rates over time. For a more detailed analysis, please refer to the link provided.

Figure 2: Extracted trends - annual series.

- Job to job transition
- Interstate migration
- Job destruction rate
- Job creation rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Level Year</th>
<th>Non Adjacent</th>
<th>Adjacent</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Metro</th>
<th>U.S. Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>18,563,548</td>
<td>22,820,635</td>
<td>41,384,183</td>
<td>208,238,817</td>
<td>249,623,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>20,071,333</td>
<td>26,173,406</td>
<td>46,244,739</td>
<td>263,093,682</td>
<td>309,338,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>19,909,962</td>
<td>26,111,196</td>
<td>46,021,158</td>
<td>279,698,020</td>
<td>325,719,178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### National growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Non Adjacent</th>
<th>Adjacent</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Metro</th>
<th>U.S. Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-2017</td>
<td>7.25%</td>
<td>14.42%</td>
<td>11.20%</td>
<td>34.32%</td>
<td>30.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2017</td>
<td>-0.80%</td>
<td>-0.24%</td>
<td>-0.48%</td>
<td>6.31%</td>
<td>5.30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Percentage (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Non Adjacent</th>
<th>Adjacent</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Metro</th>
<th>U.S. Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counties that gained population 1990-2017</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
<td>74.2%</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
<td>88.0%</td>
<td>69.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counties that gained population 2X National Average 1990-2017</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counties that gained population 2010-2017</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>74.8%</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counties that gained population 2X National Average 2010-2017</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1993 Urban Influence Codes definitions).

Nonmetro Areas

- Non Adjacent: 5.9%
- Adj. to Small Metro: 16.8%
- Adj. to Large Metro: 36.2%

Metro Areas

- 50-100k: 26.2%
- 100-250k: 31.6%
- 250k-1M: 33.6%
- 1-3M: 39.3%
- 3M+: 30.9%

**Nonmetro Areas**
- Non-Adjacent: 4.0%
- Adjacent to Small Metro: 11.4%
- Adjacent to Large Metro: 26.9%

**Metro Areas**
- 50-100k: 41.3%
- 100-250k: 39.2%
- 250k-1M: 34.6%
- 1-3M: 38.4%
- 3M+: 41.3%
2012 Romney Presidential Election
Share, All Counties

*Note: Figure contains Romney's share of Romney and Obama's votes only.

Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab
2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, All Metro Counties

*Note: Figure contains Romney’s share of Romney and Obama’s votes only.

Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab
2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, Large Metro Counties

*Note: Figure contains Romney’s share of Romney and Obama’s votes only.

Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab
2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, Small Metro Counties

*Note: Figure contains Romney’s share of Romney and Obama’s votes only.

Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab
2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, Nonmetro Counties

*Note: Figure contains Romney’s share of Romney and Obama’s votes only.

Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab
2016 Trump Presidential Election Share Minus 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, All Counties

Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab

*Note: Figure contains Romney’s share of Romney and Obama’s votes only and Trump’s share of Trump and Clinton’s votes only.
2016 Trump Presidential Election Share Minus 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, All Metro Counties

*Note: Figure contains Romney’s share of Romney and Obama’s votes only and Trump’s share of Trump and Clinton’s votes only.

Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab
2016 Trump Presidential Election Share Minus 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, Large Metro Counties

Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab

*Note: Figure contains Romney’s share of Romney and Obama’s votes only and Trump’s share of Trump and Clinton’s votes only.
2016 Trump Presidential Election Share Minus 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, Small Metro Counties

*Note: Figure contains Romney’s share of Romney and Obama’s votes only and Trump’s share of Trump and Clinton’s votes only.

Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab
2016 Trump Presidential Election Share Minus 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, Nonmetro Counties

*Note: Figure contains Romney’s share of Romney and Obama’s votes only and Trump’s share of Trump and Clinton’s votes only.

Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab
2010 to 2018 Percent Change in Employment, All Counties

Source: QCEW
2010 to 2018 Percent Change in Employment, Large Metro Counties

Source: QCEW
2006-2018 Percentage Change in Job Creation, Metro Counties

Note: Q1 2006 and Q1 2018 used for all states but ME and SD. Q4 2006 and Q4 2017 used for ME. Q4 2006 and Q4 2016 used for SD. No 2006 data for MA.

Source: LEHD QWI
2010 to 2018 Percent Change in Employment, Small Metro Counties

Source: QCEW
2015 Per Capita GDP (in thousands of dollars), Metro Counties

Source: BEA
2015 Per Capita GDP (in thousands of dollars), Nonmetro Counties

Source: BEA
2017 Per Capita Income (in thousands of dollars), Metro Counties

Source: BEA
2017 Per Capita Income (in thousands of dollars), Nonmetro Counties

Source: BEA
Job Creation and Job Destruction as Percentages of Employment, National

Source: BDS
Percent Change in Job Creation and Job Destruction, National

Source: BDS
Job Creation and Job Destruction Rates, Metro

Source: BDS
Job Creation and Job Destruction Rates, Nonmetro

Source: BDS
Percent Change in Job Creation and Job Destruction, Nonmetro

Source: BDS
2010 Job Creation as a Percentage of Employment, Nonmetro Counties

Source: LEHD QWI

Note: Q1 2010 used for all states but MA, ME, and SD. Q2 2010 used for MA. Q4 2010 used for ME and SD.
2010 Job Destruction as a Percentage of Employment, Metro Counties

Source: LEHD QWI

Note: Q1 2010 used for all states but MA, ME, and SD. Q2 2010 used for MA. Q4 2010 used for ME and SD.
2018 Job Destruction as a Percentage of Employment, Metro Counties

Source: LEHD QWI
Note: Q1 2018 used for all states but MA, ME, and SD. Q2 2018 used for MA, Q4 2017 used for ME, and Q4 2016 used for SD.
2006-2018 Percentage Change in Job Destruction, Metro Counties

Note: Q1 2006 and Q1 2018 used for all states but ME and SD. Q4 2006 and Q4 2017 used for ME. Q4 2006 and Q4 2016 used for SD. No 2006 data for MA.

Source: LEHD QWI
2010 Job Destruction as a Percentage of Employment, Nonmetro Counties

Note: Q1 2010 used for all states but MA, ME, and SD. Q2 2010 used for MA. Q4 2010 used for ME and SD.

Source: LEHD QWI
2010-2018 Percentage Change in Job Creation, Nonmetro Counties

Note: Q1 2010 and Q1 2018 used for all states but MA, ME, and SD. Q2 2010 and Q2 2018 used for MA. Q4 2010 and Q4 2017 used for ME. Q4 2010 and Q4 2016 used for SD.

Source: LEHD QWI
2010-2018 Percentage Change in Job Destruction, Nonmetro Counties

Note: Q1 2010 and Q1 2018 used for all states but MA, ME, and SD. Q2 2010 and Q2 2018 used for MA. Q4 2010 and Q4 2017 used for ME. Q4 2010 and Q4 2016 used for SD.

Source: LEHD QWI
2017 Small Firm Employment Share, Metro Counties

Note: Q4 2017 used for all states but SD. Q4 2016 used for SD. Small firms have 50 or fewer employees.

Source: LEHD QWI
Percent Change in New and Small Firm Employment, National

*Note: Q1 data used in all years.

Source: LEHD QWI
Small Firm Employment Percentages, Metro and Nonmetro

Source: CBP
Percent Change in Small Establishment Share of Total Establishments, National

Source: CBP
Wage and Salary Employment Growth, National

Source: BEA
Self Employment Growth, National

U.S. Metro
U.S. Nonmetro

Source: BEA
2010-2017 Percentage Change in Small Firm Employment Share, Metro Counties

Note: Q4 2010 and Q4 2017 used for all states but SD. Q4 2010 and Q4 2016 used for SD. Small firms have 50 or fewer employees.

Source: LEHD QWI
2010-2017 Percentage Change in Small Firm Employment Share, Nonmetro Counties

Note: Q4 2010 and Q4 2017 used for all states but SD. Q4 2010 and Q4 2016 used for SD. Small firms have 50 or fewer employees.

Source: LEHD QWI
2010-2017 Percentage Change in New Firm Employment Share, Metro Counties

Note: Q4 2010 and Q4 2017 used for all states but SD. Q4 2010 and Q4 2016 used for SD. New firms are less than or equal to 3 years old.

Source: LEHD QWI
2010-2017 Percentage Change in New Firm Employment Share, Nonmetro Counties

Note: Q4 2010 and Q4 2017 used for all states but SD. Q4 2010 and Q4 2016 used for SD. New firms are less than or equal to 3 years old.

Source: LEHD QWI
2017 Self Employment Share, Metro Counties

Source: BEA
2017 Self Employment Share, Nonmetro Counties

Source: BEA
2006-2017 Percentage Change in Small Firm Employment Share, Nonmetro Counties

Source: LEHD QWI

Note: Q4 2006 and Q4 2017 used for all states but SD. Q4 2006 and Q4 2016 used for SD. No 2006 data for MA. Small firms have 50 or fewer employees.
2010-2017 Percentage Change in Self Employment Share, Metro Counties
2006-2017 Percentage Change in Small Firm Employment Share, Metro Counties

Note: Q4 2006 and Q4 2017 used for all states but SD. Q4 2006 and Q4 2016 used for SD. No 2006 data for MA. Small firms have 50 or fewer employees.

Source: LEHD QWI
2010-2017 Percentage Change in Self Employment Share, Nonmetro Counties

Source: BEA
2006-2017 Percentage Change in New Firm Employment Share, Metro Counties

Note: Q4 2006 and Q4 2017 used for all states but SD. Q4 2006 and Q4 2016 used for SD. No 2006 data for MA. New firms are less than or equal to 3 years old.

Source: LEHD QWI
2006-2017 Percentage Change in New Firm Employment Share, Nonmetro Counties

Note: Q4 2006 and Q4 2017 used for all states but SD. Q4 2006 and Q4 2016 used for SD. No 2006 data for MA. New firms are less than or equal to 3 years old.

Source: LEHD QWI