



**THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY**

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# **Regional Analysis in the Age of Populism**

**AUBER Annual Conference**

**Savannah, GA**

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
Ohio State University and Ph.D. Program, Urban Studies and  
Regional Science, Gran Sasso Science Institute, L'Aquila, Italy

# Introduction

- Much (but not all) of rural America has struggled since the Great Recession's conclusion in 2009, representing a long-run trend dating to the 1920s.
- Rural American will play a future role, but many rural places are economically unsustainable. Rural areas are the primary source of environment, food, energy, other commodities, natural amenities, water, etc.
- Rural lags in many ways. But trends are not always clear; e.g., for nonmetro/metro per-capita income
  - 1969-76 = .755; 1996-2003 = .724; 2010-2017 = .759
  - **But underlying all of this are national trends.**

# Share of Income Earned by Top 1 Percent, 1975–2015


Percent



Source: World Wealth and Income Database.

# A tale of two countries

The share of U.S. pre-tax income accruing to the bottom 50 percent and top one percent of income earners, 1962-2014




Source: Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and Gabriel Zucman, "Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States," 2016, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research

Note: The unit is the individual adult and incomes within married couples are split equally.




# Total tax rate (federal, state and local)



# Highest marginal tax rate

100 percent


## The New York Times



Source: Tax Policy Center

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/24/business/economy/wealth-tax-rich.html>

# US balance of trade, 1978-2018




Source: E-trade and BEA. <https://us.etrade.com/knowledge/library/perspectives/market-happenings/us-trade-deficit-february-2019>

# Estate tax exemption

In 2016 dollars

\$12 million

The New York Times



YEAR OF DEATH

\*In 2010, the estate tax was repealed for one year.

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/24/business/economy/wealth-tax-rich.html>

# Introduction

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- These trends appear to have contributed to rising rural angst and even anger in some cases. This economic angst has helped spawn a rise of so-called “right-wing nationalist populist” movements with strong rural bases.
  - Emergence of right-wing nationalist populist movements have occurred in Europe, Brazil, Australia, India.
- Of course, historically, there are many examples of rural “populism” in the U.S.:
  - E.g., 1820s-1840s, 1870s, 1890s, 1920s-1930s
  - And rural America has tilted conservative for the last 50 years.

# Introduction

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- There are other factors involved in potential rural U.S. populism.
- Rural residents sometimes have an inferiority complex regarding urbanites.
- Feelings that the elites don't weigh rural concerns in decision-making.
- Cultural differences and potential racial grievances.
- Decline of primary industries and manufacturing.
- All of this when rural America is a big net winner in terms of net federal expenditures.

# Introduction

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- 1) What I want to do now is some armchair political analysis to see if there is anything special about today.
- 2) Then I will ask if rural America's economy is really suffering. *Sort-of* but past trends recently accelerated.
- 3) Then I will discuss one potential cause that has been floated by both conservatives and progressives (AEI): declining dynamism in the American economy that slows needed adjustments to higher-valued uses in capital and labor markets as well as spatially.

# Voting Patterns in rural, small, and large cities.

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- Voting patterns show a strong urban/rural influence as one.
- The spatial patterns signify one area that strongly switched to Trump, which I will stress in my discussion of rural populism and rural economies.

Table 1 2016 Election Results for Trump


	Metro Definition and Change	Total Metro Votes	Trump Metro Votes	Trump Metro Votes Share
(1)	Metro 1950	68,380,703	25,469,903	37%
(2)	Metro Def. Change 1950-1973	26,522,379	14,147,642	53%
(3)	Metro Def. Change 1973-1983	6,245,681	3,457,467	55%
(4)	Metro Def. Change 1983-1993	3,764,839	2,214,950	59%
(5)	Metro Def. Change 1993-2003	3,548,019	2,075,511	60%
(6)	Metro Def. Change 2003-2013	2,040,345	1,298,349	63%
(7)	Metro 2013	110,501,966	48,663,822	44%
(8)	Nonmetro 2013	19,409,615	12,401,021	64%
(9)	Total United States	129,911,581	61,064,843	47%

Source: Townhall.com. Missing county-level data for Alaska. Current metropolitan counties are split into those defined in 1950 and those that were subsequently reclassified as metropolitan by time period of reclassification.

# Romney vs. Trump Vote Shares


- Romney 2012
  - Nonmetro: 59.62%
  - Small metro: 53.81%
  - Large metro: 43.92%
  
- Romney 2012 - Trump 2016
  - Nonmetro: -7.39%
  - Small metro: -3.09%
  - Large metro: 0.97%

# 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, All Counties




# 2016 Trump Presidential Election Share Minus 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, All Counties

Emerging "Populist" region



# 2016 Trump Presidential Election Share Minus 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, Nonmetro Counties



# Difference between Trump and Romney Vote Share Correlations, National


	<b>Metro</b>	<b>Nonmetro</b>
Difference between Trump and Romney Vote Share vs. 2010 to 2018 Job Growth	<b>-0.1921</b>	<b>-0.0853</b>
Difference between Trump and Romney Vote Share vs. 2017 New Firm Employment Share	<b>-0.1902</b>	<b>-0.1520</b>
Difference between Trump and Romney Vote Share vs. 2006 to 2018 Percent Change in Job Creation	<b>-0.0402</b>	<b>0.0030</b>
Difference between Trump and Romney Vote Share vs. 2006 to 2018 Percent Change in Job Destruction	<b>-0.1016</b>	<b>-0.0213</b>
Difference between Trump and Romney Vote Share vs. 2016 Manufacturing Employment Share	<b>0.2848</b>	<b>0.2003</b>

# Rural Economic Performance

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- We now turn to rural economic structure and consider if things differ in the Trump “populist” region.
- Then we examine relative rural job growth since the Great Recession. No surprise, rural has done poorly.
- **Rural is much more than agriculture.**
- Relative to urban America, rural manufacturing has fared much better.

**Figure 1, Population Growth of Non-Metro Area by historical MSA Definition:  
100 = 1969 Population**



Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis for population and U.S. Census Bureau for metro definitions.

# U.S. Payroll Growth, selected periods


Source QCEW

Today Rural/Nonmetro Job growth really lags

	2001 to 2010	2010 to 2018	2001 to 2018
<b>United States</b>	<b>-1.31</b>	<b>14.49</b>	<b>12.99</b>
<b>U.S. Metro</b>	<b>-0.95</b>	<b>16.96</b>	<b>15.85</b>
<b>U.S. Nonmetro</b>	<b>-3.19</b>	<b>0.85</b>	<b>-2.38</b>

# Population change by metro/nonmetro status, 1976-2017

Percent change from previous year




Note: Metro status changed for some counties in 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010.

Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from the U.S. Census Bureau.


# Population growth 1990-2017 (%)

1993 USDA and U.S. Census Bureau MSA Definitions




# Population growth 2010-2017 (%)

1993 USDA and U.S. Census Bureau MSA Definitions




# Nonmetro-Metro Domestic Net Migration and Nonmetro-Metro Gross Movers from Abroad

Net domestic migration    Movers from abroad




# Share of Employment in Manufacturing, 1969-2016

Decline almost everywhere.




Source: BEA

# Share of U.S. Manufacturing Employment in Nonmetro Areas and Nonmetro Manufacturing Location Quotient, 1969-2017



# Figure 1

## Percentage of Total Jobs in Farming: 1969 - 2015




Source: Farming share of total employment for Metropolitan, Non-Metropolitan, and US : Bureau of Economic Analysis; Total Full-Time and Part-Time Employment CA25 (1969 – 2000) CA25N (2001 – 2015). Farming as primary job as a share of total employment: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table cpsaat01


# Figure 1. Farming-Dependent Counties in 1950 and 2000

## Nonmetro farming-dependent counties, 1950

The western populist region is farm country and the eastern part was much more manufacturing.





## Nonmetro farming-dependent counties, 2000



Source: Farming-dependent counties are defined by ERS. Metro/nonmetro status is based on the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) June 2003 classification.


# 2010 to 2018 Percent Change in Employment, All Metro Counties



Source: QCEW

# 2010 to 2018 Percent Change in Employment, Nonmetro Counties

Eastern populist region did relatively well, not so in the Western part.



# Declining Dynamism


- By declining dynamism since 1970s, I mean there is:
  - 1) Less job creation and job destruction. Classic Schumpeterian creative destruction implies that resources are then less likely to flow to higher-valued uses. (not the same thing as saying net job growth has declined—though it has).
  - 2) Lower rates of firm births and deaths. In terms of firm births, new firms and small firms disproportionately create new *net* jobs for the national economy (Neumark et al., 2011; Haltiwanger et al. 2013).
    - E.g., Low-productivity zombie firms kept alive by low interest rates. Schumpeterian disruptive forces and creative destruction are restricted.
  - 3) Declining migration rates or less moving to opportunity or to more productive regions (Partridge et. al, 2012). OR people stay in struggling rural areas, becoming quite frustrated.

# Introduction

- By declining dynamism, I mean there is:
  - 4) Concentration of large firms with less product market competition leading to less innovation and higher prices.
  - 5) Declining occupational mobility due to licensing and education requirements (Davis et al., 2012).
  - 6) Declining labor-market fluidity: e.g., flows from employment to unemployment; from unemployment to employment; flows from employment to out of labor force; flows from out of labor force to employment; job to job changes; interstate migration; job creation; and job destruction (Malloy et al., 2016).
    - **May be caused by factors such as non-compete contracts, binding arbitration, nondisclosure agreements.**

# Trend in Labor Market Fluidity Across the U.S., 1980-2013


Fluidity has been declining nationally across 8 dimensions\* since the early 1980s, but the trend varies by state




\*Dimensions include flows from employment to unemployment; from unemployment to employment; from employment to out of the labor force; from out of the labor force to employment; job to job changes; interstate migration; job creation; and job destruction.

Source: From "Understanding declining fluidity in the U.S. labor market" by Raven Molloy, Christopher L. Smith, and Riccardo Trezzi, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2016.

Figure 2: Extracted tra



### Figure A-1. Number of Movers and Mover Rate: 1948-2018



Note: The CPS sample design was generally updated in years ending in "5" based on previous decennial censuses.

\* The migration question was asked differently between 1971 and 1980. Only 1971 and 1976 have a 1-year estimate comparable to all other years (1948-2018).

\*\* Data for the following years are: 2011 (2000 controls), 2010 (2000 controls), 2001 (SCHIP, 2000 controls), 1993 (1990 controls).


Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1948-2018.

# Rural Economic Performance


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- So, how much of rural America's problem is their economies are becoming relatively less dynamic?
- Job creation (job openings filled) are definitely a plus.
- Some job destruction is necessary for “creative destruction” to shift resources to more productive uses. Of course, too much destruction would be problematic.
- This spells places that would not have many opportunities and people would be stuck in bad settings.
- Does this line up in the “populist” Northeast region?


# Job Creation and Job Destruction as Percentages of Employment, Metro



# Job Creation and Job Destruction as Percentages of Employment, Nonmetro




# 2018 Job Creation as a Percentage of Employment, Metro Counties



# 2018 Job Creation as a Percentage of Employment, Nonmetro Counties


Relative job growth may not be “bad” but fewer new opportunities.




Note: Q1 2018 used for all states but MA, ME, and SD. Q2 2018 used for MA, Q4 2017 used for ME, and Q4 2016 used for SD.

Source: LEHD QWI

# 2018 Job Destruction as a Percentage of Employment, Nonmetro Counties




# 2006-2018 Percentage Change in Job Creation, Nonmetro Counties



Note: Q1 2006 and Q1 2018 used for all states but ME and SD. Q4 2006 and Q4 2017 used for ME. Q4 2006 and Q4 2016 used for SD. No 2006 data for MA.

Source: LEHD QWI

# 2006-2018 Percentage Change in Job Destruction, Nonmetro Counties



Note: Q1 2006 and Q1 2018 used for all states but ME and SD. Q4 2006 and Q4 2017 used for ME. Q4 2006 and Q4 2016 used for SD. No 2006 data for MA.


Source: LEHD QWI

# Rural Economic Performance


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- Small and new firms are associated with faster job growth and subsequently faster future economic growth.
- What are the patterns of small-firm and new-firm development?
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# Small Establishment Share of Total Establishments, National <50 employees




# New and Small Firm Employment Percentages, National




\*Note: Q1 data used in all years.

# Self Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment, National





# Nonfarm Self Employment Income as a Share of Nonfarm Personal Income, National



# 2017 Small Firm Employment Share, Nonmetro Counties


Fewer small firms—less entrepreneurship?



Note: Q4 2017 used for all states but SD. Q4 2016 used for SD. Small firms have 50 or fewer employees.

Source: LEHD QWI



# 2017 New Firm Employment Share, Metro Counties



Note: Q4 2017 used for all states but SD. Q4 2016 used for SD. New firms are less than or equal to 3 years old.

# 2017 New Firm Employment Share, Nonmetro Counties

Less New-firm job  
growth, less  
entrepreneurship?



Note: Q4 2017 used for all states but SD. Q4 2016 used for SD. New firms are less than or equal to 3 years old.

# Conclusions

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- Americans are increasingly divided along political and rural/urban lines.
- Some of this may be related to weak national economic performance, rising inequities, perceptions of a “rigged” system.
- President Trump’s relative electoral gains were most impressive in “Northeast” nonmetro America.
- Outside of manufacturing’s role in driving some of this, topline rural economic numbers are not that different.
- But that region appears less dynamic in terms of less job creation, new-firm employment growth, fewer small firms, suggesting a somewhat less dynamic economy.
  - This pattern applies more strongly in the eastern parts of the populist region.

# Thank you


[partridge.27@osu.edu](mailto:partridge.27@osu.edu)

*Google Mark Partridge economist*

# Per Capita GDP and Per Capita Income Correlations, National

	Metro	Nonmetro
2015 per capita GDP vs. 2015 per capita personal income, unweighted	0.5523	0.5521
2015 per capita GDP vs. 2015 per capita personal income, population-weighted	0.7973	0.6040
2012-2015 % $\Delta$ per capita GDP vs. 2012-2015 % $\Delta$ per capita personal income, unweighted	0.2213	0.3017
2012-2015 % $\Delta$ per capita GDP vs. 2012-2015 % $\Delta$ per capita personal income, population-weighted	0.3490	0.3427

# Median household income growth, 2000-2007



## Historical Highest Marginal Income Tax Rates




Year	Top Marginal Rate	Year	Top Marginal Rate	Year	Top Marginal Rate
1913	7.0%	1948	82.13%	1983	50.00%
1914	7.0%	1949	82.13%	1984	50.00%
1915	7.0%	1950	84.36%	1985	50.00%
1916	15.0%	1951	91.00%	1986	50.00%
1917	67.0%	1952	92.00%	1987	38.50%
1918	77.0%	1953	92.00%	1988	28.00%
1919	73.0%	1954	91.00%	1989	28.00%
1920	73.0%	1955	91.00%	1990	28.00%
1921	73.0%	1956	91.00%	1991	31.00%
1922	58.0%	1957	91.00%	1992	31.00%
1923	43.5%	1958	91.00%	1993	39.60%
1924	46.0%	1959	91.00%	1994	39.60%
1925	25.0%	1960	91.00%	1995	39.60%
1926	25.0%	1961	91.00%	1996	39.60%
1927	25.0%	1962	91.00%	1997	39.60%
1928	25.0%	1963	91.00%	1998	39.60%
1929	25.0%	1964	91.00%	1999	39.60%
1930	25.0%	1965	91.00%	2000	35.00%
1931	25.0%	1966	91.00%	2001	35.00%
1932	25.0%	1967	91.00%	2002	35.00%
1933	63.0%	1968	75.25%	2003	35.00%
1934	63.0%	1969	77.00%	2004	35.00%
1935	63.0%	1970	71.75%	2005	35.00%
1936	79.0%	1971	70.00%	2006	35.00%
1937	79.0%	1972	70.00%	2007	35.00%
1938	79.0%	1973	70.00%	2008	35.00%
1939	79.0%	1974	70.00%	2009	35.00%
1940	81.10%	1975	70.00%	2010	35.00%
1941	81.00%	1976	70.00%	2011	35.00%
1942	88.00%	1977	70.00%	2012	35.00%
1943	88.00%	1978	70.00%	2013	39.60%
1944	94.00%	1979	70.00%	2014	39.60%
1945	94.00%	1980	70.00%	2015	39.60%
1946	86.45%	1981	69.13%	2016	39.60%
1947	86.45%	1982	50.00%	2017	39.60%

**The**

<https://thedailycpa.com/2019/01/07/what-would-a-70-tax-bracket-look-like/>

Note: This table contains a number of simplifications and ignores a number

Figure 2: Extracted trends - annual series.





# Population and Population growth 1990-2017, 2010-2017



<i>Population Level Year</i>	Non Metro			Metro	U.S. Total
	Non Adjacent	Adjacent	Total		
<b>1990</b>	18,563,548	22,820,635	41,384,183	208,238,817	249,623,000
<b>2010</b>	20,071,333	26,173,406	46,244,739	263,093,682	309,338,421
<b>2017</b>	19,909,962	26,111,196	46,021,158	279,698,020	325,719,178
<i>National growth</i>					
<b>1990-2017</b>	7.25%	14.42%	11.20%	34.32%	30.48%
<b>2010-2017</b>	-0.80%	-0.24%	-0.48%	6.31%	5.30%
<i>Percentage (%)</i>					
<b>Counties that gained population 1990-2017</b>	53.6%	74.2%	62.6%	88.0%	69.3%
<b>Counties that gained population 2X National Average 1990-2017</b>	4.2%	7.5%	5.7%	25.2%	10.9%
<b>Counties that gained population 2010-2017</b>	34.4%	38.5%	36.2%	74.8%	46.5%
<b>Counties that gained population 2X National Average 2010-2017</b>	1.8%	3.6%	2.6%	18.5%	6.8%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1993 Urban Influence Codes definitions).


# Population growth (%) 1990-2017 by MSA size (1993 USDA and U.S. Census Bureau MSA Definitions, 1990 population)




# Population growth (%) 1990-2017 by city size (2013 USDA and U.S. Census Bureau MSA Definitions, 2017 Population)




# 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, All Counties




# 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, All Metro Counties




# 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, Large Metro Counties




# 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, Small Metro Counties




# 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, Nonmetro Counties




# 2016 Trump Presidential Election Share Minus 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, All Counties




# 2016 Trump Presidential Election Share Minus 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, All Metro Counties




# 2016 Trump Presidential Election Share Minus 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, Large Metro Counties




# 2016 Trump Presidential Election Share Minus 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, Small Metro Counties




# 2016 Trump Presidential Election Share Minus 2012 Romney Presidential Election Share, Nonmetro Counties




# 2010 to 2018 Percent Change in Employment, All Counties




# 2010 to 2018 Percent Change in Employment, Large Metro Counties




# 2006-2018 Percentage Change in Job Creation, Metro Counties




# 2010 to 2018 Percent Change in Employment, Small Metro Counties




# 2015 Per Capita GDP (in thousands of dollars), Metro Counties




# 2015 Per Capita GDP (in thousands of dollars), Nonmetro Counties



# 2017 Per Capita Income (in thousands of dollars), Metro Counties




# 2017 Per Capita Income (in thousands of dollars), Nonmetro Counties




Source: BEA


# Job Creation and Job Destruction as Percentages of Employment, National




# Percent Change in Job Creation and Job Destruction, National




# Job Creation and Job Destruction Rates, National




# Job Creation and Job Destruction Rates, Metro




# Job Creation and Job Destruction Rates, Nonmetro



# Percent Change in Job Creation and Job Destruction, Nonmetro




# 2010 Job Creation as a Percentage of Employment, Nonmetro Counties




Note: Q1 2010 used for all states but MA, ME, and SD. Q2 2010 used for MA. Q4 2010 used for ME and SD.

Source: LEHD QWI


# 2010 Job Destruction as a Percentage of Employment, Metro Counties




# 2018 Job Destruction as a Percentage of Employment, Metro Counties




# 2006-2018 Percentage Change in Job Destruction, Metro Counties



# 2010 Job Destruction as a Percentage of Employment, Nonmetro Counties




# 2010-2018 Percentage Change in Job Creation, Nonmetro Counties




Note: Q1 2010 and Q1 2018 used for all states but MA, ME, and SD. Q2 2010 and Q2 2018 used for MA. Q4 2010 and Q4 2017 used for ME. Q4 2010 and Q4 2016 used for SD.

Source: LEHD QWI


# 2010-2018 Percentage Change in Job Destruction, Nonmetro Counties




# 2010-2018 Percentage Change in Job Destruction, Metro Counties



# 2017 Small Firm Employment Share, Metro Counties




# Percent Change in New and Small Firm Employment, National




\*Note: Q1 data used in all years.


# Small Firm Employment Percentages, Metro and Nonmetro




# Percent Change in Small Establishment Share of Total Establishments, National




# Wage and Salary Employment Growth, National




# Self Employment Growth, National




# 2010-2017 Percentage Change in Small Firm Employment Share, Metro Counties




# 2010-2017 Percentage Change in Small Firm Employment Share, Nonmetro Counties




# 2010-2017 Percentage Change in New Firm Employment Share, Metro Counties




# 2010-2017 Percentage Change in New Firm Employment Share, Nonmetro Counties




# 2017 Self Employment Share, Metro Counties




# 2017 Self Employment Share, Nonmetro Counties




# 2006-2017 Percentage Change in Small Firm Employment Share, Nonmetro Counties




# 2010-2017 Percentage Change in Self Employment Share, Metro Counties




# 2006-2017 Percentage Change in Small Firm Employment Share, Metro Counties



# 2010-2017 Percentage Change in Self Employment Share, Nonmetro Counties



# 2006-2017 Percentage Change in New Firm Employment Share, Metro Counties



# 2006-2017 Percentage Change in New Firm Employment Share, Nonmetro Counties

